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MARITIME TERRORISM
Focusing on the Probable
Richard Farrell
As groups prepare to memorialize the sixth anniversary of 9/11, Americansseem to have forgotten that terrorism has long had a prominent role in
American history. Geoffrey Blainey describes American anarchists and assassins
in the 1900s who were the equivalent of modern suicide bombers.1 Blainey re-
minds us that terrorism killed an American president (William McKinley) in
1901, a hundred years before 9/11.
Currently, there is a great deal of angst about maritime terrorism, but is it jus-
tified? Fueling the anxiety is the fact that the world’s oceans sustain the global
economy. At any given time, forty thousand vessels are chugging across the
world’s oceans—globalization’s superhighway—employing more than a million
seafarers of virtually every nationality. Over the last four decades, seaborne trade
has nearly quadrupled.2 The U.S. Maritime Administration reports that more
than seven million shipping containers enter American ports each year.3
Concerns about maritime security and the vulnerability of maritime assets
were reinforced by an incident in October 2001. At the southern Italian port of
Gioia Tauro, a suspected al-Qa‘ida terrorist was found inside a maritime ship-
ping container, equipped for the duration of the con-
tainer’s intended voyage. Intelligence sources say
other containers similarly fitted out were found at the
Italian port. This alarming discovery underlined the
tension between the needs of international security,
economic freedom, and global trade.4
Despite the headlines, articles, and books written
since 9/11, however, a terrorist attack at sea is not
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necessarily imminent. Various terrorism studies, particularly a RAND Corpora-
tion analysis in 1983, argue that terrorism is overwhelmingly a land-based phe-
nomenon.5 The National Targeting Center documented 651 terrorist attacks in
2004; however, only two were maritime attacks. The first was a suicide attack ini-
tially intended for Iraq’s Khawr Al Amaya Oil Terminal but actually conducted
against a small boat from the coastal patrol ship USS Firebolt (PC 10); the second
was the bombing of the Superferry 14 in Manila Bay, in the Philippines.6 Why
were there only two attacks in the seemingly vulnerable maritime domain?
Given the small percentage of terrorist acts at sea, is increased attention of lim-
ited maritime forces justified?
Several Department of Defense officials and executives in other government
agencies believe that tracking all worldwide maritime vessels is the key to defeat-
ing terrorism at sea. While having visibility of ship locations is an important
piece of the puzzle, however, more focus is needed on a different aspect of terror-
ism at sea. Maritime counterterrorism and antiterrorism should concentrate on
disrupting the movement of people, terror-related cargo, and financial support of
terror groups. Rather than using ships as weapons or targets, terrorists are using
criminal activities at sea to support land-based terrorism.
WHY DOES THIS MATTER?
Because of the requirement to capture headlines, terrorists are under constant
pressure to do something new. Terror groups also have access to media reports
detailing the economic impact of maritime trade on globalization. Conse-
quently, some maritime experts claim that a single well-aimed terrorist attack
could paralyze global maritime commerce.7 Others observe that most of the
world’s manufacturing capability is dependent on just-in-time delivery of com-
ponents; they claim that a major attack on shipping could interrupt just-in-time
deliveries and strike a staggering blow to the global economy.8
In contrast, this article seeks to show that a major maritime attack is not pre-
ordained. Maritime targets are harder to attack than those on land, and most
terror groups do not have the experience or expertise to do so successfully. The
few terror groups that do have maritime skills are unable to project their power
past their home turf and depend enormously upon their relationship with locals
to “blend into the crowd” after an attack.
The real issue to be confronted is the conservation of resources. The West has
a fixed stock of resources, people, and platforms with which to counter global
terrorism. The United States and its partners must focus on land-based terror-
ism and sever its support rather than invest maritime resources against unlikely
terrorist actions at sea.
* * * * * * *
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This is not to say that terror groups do not consider seaports, commercial ship-
ping, and international cruise lines attractive targets.9 Al-Qa‘ida initiated a mari-
time terror campaign several months before 9/11, and many Americans believe
that it has the capability to conduct successful attacks on maritime targets today.
They assert that the suicide attacks in Yemen and the Persian Gulf demonstrate
al-Qa‘ida’s ability to terrorize global shipping.10 In January 2000, a U.S. Navy
warship made a port call in Yemen as part of a Central Command effort to in-
crease military-to-military contacts and cooperation.11 The guided-missile de-
stroyer USS The Sullivans (DDG 68) found itself in al-Qa‘ida’s crosshairs: a
small boat loaded with explosives was prepared to ram into the destroyer. The
would-be suicide bombers pushed the boat down the landing and into the water.
However, the explosives weighed too much and sank the boat.12
The al-Qa‘ida cell involved held a meeting in Malaysia just days after the Sulli-
vans failure. Tawfiq bin Attash, an Osama Bin Laden lieutenant and primary
maritime planner, flew to Malaysia to attend the meeting and set up another at-
tack on a U.S. warship.13 That October, having reviewed tactics at the Malaysia
meeting, the cell pursued a second attack, in Aden, Yemen. This time it was suc-
cessful; a small-boat attack against the USS Cole (DDG 67) killed seventeen sail-
ors and severely damaged the ship.14
Another scheme to attack American warships was discovered in Singapore.
The cell planning the Singapore attacks was affiliated with Jemaah Islamiyah, an
Islamic terror group with links to al-Qa‘ida.15 Jemaah Islamiyah planned to at-
tack ships steaming along Sembawang, on Singapore’s north coast. Mirroring
the Cole tactics, the markings on a captured Jemaah Islamiyah map identified a
strategic kill zone where the channel was narrow. A warship would not have
room to avoid a collision with an explosive-filled suicide boat. Still, the attacks
were not accomplished, because the Jemaah Islamiyah cell could not implement
the plan by itself, lacking maritime capability and expertise. The plot was dis-
rupted shortly after 9/11, along with plans to conduct land-based terrorism
against American businessmen.16
In October 2002, the Limburg, a 299,000-ton oil tanker, was attacked during
an approach to the pilot station at Mina Al-Dabah, Yemen.17 One crew member
died, and ninety thousand barrels of crude spilled into the sea. Investigations
confirmed that a boat filled with explosives had rammed the vessel after failing
to find a U.S. warship.18 The most recent attack against American ships occurred
in August 2005. In it, al-Qa‘ida’s targets were the amphibious assault ship USS
Kearsarge (LHD 3) and dock landing ship USS Ashland (LSD 48) alongside a pier
in Aquaba, Jordan.19 The terrorists failed, killing a Jordanian guard but no
Americans.
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MARITIME TERROR GROUPS
One major reason for the small number of maritime attacks is that only a few
terror organizations have the capability to conduct them, even in their own areas
of influence. However, one terror organization with vigorous maritime exper-
tise is the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Its maritime branch, the Sea
Tigers, has pioneered modern maritime terrorism. LTTE’s struggle for an inde-
pendent Hindu Tamil homeland in northern Sri Lanka has included hundreds
of maritime attacks and suicide bombings that have killed more than sixty-four
thousand people.20
The Sea Tigers have successfully executed small-boat suicide attacks since
1984. The Woodrow Wilson School of Politics and International Affairs declares
that the Sea Tigers “have taken on the Sri Lankan Navy with unprecedented suc-
cess.” Its study claims that they have destroyed 30 to 50 percent of Sri Lanka’s na-
val coastal craft, an impressive statistic, as patrol boats are the mainstay of the Sri
Lankan navy.21 The Sea Tigers’ maritime terror tactics, wealth of experience, and
success with maritime terror have been studied by other terrorist groups, al-
though the LTTE’s own terror operations have been confined to Sri Lanka.22
Maritime terrorism is a serious regional security concern in Southeast Asia as
well. This area is of critical importance to the United States, because of the
amount of maritime trade passing through and its significance in its own right
to the global economy. Southeast Asia has a terrorist organization that pos-
sessed, until recently, robust maritime capabilities, the Abu Sayyaf Group, oper-
ating out of the Philippines. It conducted maritime attacks in the region for
years. The group followed an effective maritime attack doctrine. It executed
well-planned mobile operations and was adept in guerrilla tactics. It had rap-
port with and support from local fighters. It skillfully dispersed into small
groups when pursued and blended in with sympathetic local civilians. Abu
Sayyaf demonstrated a gruesome willingness to kill or injure Muslims in urban
terror operations designed to divert government attention from its own moun-
tain hideouts. It conducted information operations, including dissemination of
false information on VHF radio.23
Abu Sayyaf members and followers (regardless of faction) belong to Muslim
families with strong, centuries-old seafaring traditions. This is an important
distinction, one that separates the organization from al-Qa‘ida and other major
Islamic terror groups. Its mastery of the maritime domain and support of the lo-
cal population gave it ample capability to conduct maritime terrorism in South-
east Asia. In May 2001, Abu Sayyaf abducted three American citizens and
seventeen Filipinos at the Dos Palmas resort on Palawan. The incident received
international coverage because several of the victims, including one of the
Americans, were murdered and beheaded.24 The Dos Palmas incident triggered
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BALIKATAN 02-1, a joint operation aimed at destroying Abu Sayyaf. The end re-
sult was the neutralization of many Abu Sayyaf members in 2002, including the
reported death of one of its main leaders, Abu Sabaya, and the eventual death of
the head of the Sulu faction, known as Commander Robot.25 With their downfall,
a great deal of expertise on how to execute maritime terrorist attacks was lost.
Various analysts have examined Abu Sayyaf ’s historical and financial ties with
al-Qa‘ida.26 While connections are clearly documented, not much has come of
al-Qa‘ida’s outreach to Abu Sayyaf. Ramzi Yousef and Khalid Sheikh Muhammad
were sent before 9/11 to work with Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines and create an
al-Qa‘ida spin-off.27 Yousef, mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bomb-
ing, began training Abu Sayyaf members, and with his uncle, Khalid Sheikh Mu-
hammad, he helped set up the first al-Qa‘ida cell in the Philippines. However, in
1995 an accidental fire in their safe house compromised their plots and plans.
Ramzi Yousef was captured, convicted, and incarcerated in 1998;28 Khalid Sheikh
Muhammad was captured in Pakistan in 2003.29
MARITIME THREAT SCENARIOS
If few terror groups have expertise at sea, what are the threats to the maritime
domain? Concern has been voiced about several scenarios: smuggling terrorists,
weapons of mass destruction or WMD components in containers, dangerous
cargo ships used as weapons, attacks on oil tankers to disrupt global oil trade, at-
tacks on infrastructure around ports, and terrorist attacks on ferries.30
The George W. Bush administration gives WMD top priority, a concern re-
flected in the National Strategy for Maritime Security.31 The smuggling of a
WMD or components in a shipping container into a U.S. port is one of the most
specifically and frequently mentioned scenarios by legislators in Washington,
D.C.32 That is in concert with the president’s Maritime Security Strategy, but the
probability of a WMD attack via a container, though it cannot be reliably esti-
mated, is certainly lower than the probability of any other type of terrorist at-
tack.33 However, the potential consequences require serious attention, and the
United States has taken steps to mitigate the WMD threat.
Experts and legislators are concerned about a WMD smuggled in a container
on a truck, ship, or railroad; however, effective response is a double-edged blade.
Standardized shipboard containers have revolutionized maritime cargo. Be-
cause they can be off-loaded quickly from ships and loaded easily onto trucks or
rail cars, standardized containers have become indispensable to world com-
merce, as well as targets for crime and terrorism.34 Tracking shipboard contain-
ers is complicated by the amount of paperwork and the number of people
involved. The movement of each container is part of a transaction that can in-
volve up to twenty-five different parties: buyers, sellers, inland freighters and
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shipping lines, customs and cargo brokers, financiers and governments. A single
trade can generate thirty to forty documents, and each container can carry cargo
for several customers. A typical large containership can carry up to six thousand
twenty-foot-equivalent units (TEU),* associated with up to forty thousand doc-
uments. Approximately seven million TEUs arrived in America’s container ports
by sea in 2006, which translates into around seventeen thousand actual boxes a
day.35 To reduce the manpower required to process the numerous documents,
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has accelerated development of a
new information management system, the Automated Commercial Environ-
ment. It will enable CBP to automate evaluation of high-risk shipments, includ-
ing cargo containers, as well as speed up customs filing processes for American
importers.36
Another major issue is that containers are “intermodal”—they can travel by
sea or on land, by road or rail. An intermodal system is difficult to regulate, be-
cause it crosses jurisdictional boundaries. On a ship at sea, a container comes
under the aegis of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), a United
Nations body. On land or in a seaport, these containers pass into the hands of
national governments, which may have separate legislation for different trans-
port modes. All this creates a problem in implementing international regula-
tions.37 Despite these challenges, in December 2002 the IMO adopted more
stringent international standards for the security of ports and vessels, the Inter-
national Ship and Port Facility Security Code; however, some skeptics believe
the IMO lacks the resolve to enforce the code.38
Augmenting the IMO’s international security actions, the U.S. government
has taken several steps to keep track of container contents arriving in U.S. ports.
Programs such as the Container Security Initiative, the twenty-four-hour rule,†
and Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism have increased the difficulty
of smuggling a WMD or components into American ports.39 Additionally, Op-
eration SAFE COMMERCE, a pilot project conducted by the Transportation Safety
Administration (TSA), verifies the contents of sea containers at their point of
loading, ensures their physical security in transit, and tracks them to their final
destinations.40
Container issues aside, terrorist groups face several technical challenges in
obtaining working WMD devices. First, it is difficult for them to get weaponized
nuclear, biological, or chemical materials.41 Additionally, as the North Koreans
F A R R E L L 5 1
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showed the world, it is extremely challenging to produce a substantial nuclear
yield even in highly controlled conditions.42 Also, attempting to build or deto-
nate a WMD device for terror attack is fraught with health hazards. If the WMD
materials are not assembled and conveyed in secure spaces or behind shielding,
the builders will be exposed to lethal doses of biological agents, toxic chemicals,
or radiation, or will suffer severe burns.43 Few nations, much less transnational
terror groups, have the facilities to create, assemble, or ship nuclear or biological
weapons safely. Finally, a nuclear device would likely require so much shielding
that it would be nearly impossible to move or hide from port authorities.44
Another container-related smuggling threat is a relatively weak radiological
bomb, or “dirty bomb.” Radiological bombs, made from less radioactive and
more common materials than standard nuclear weapons, are easier to build and
deploy. However, they would produce a much smaller physical impact and cause
fewer human casualties.45 They are adequate “fear” weapons but would not in-
flict the spectacular results that al-Qa‘ida seeks. Consequently, most terror at-
tacks are planned and executed with relatively accessible conventional
explosives.
Dangerous Cargo Ships
Another hot topic of maritime vulnerability concerns ships carrying dangerous
cargo. The Homeland Security Council has specifically included terrorist attacks
on ships with flammable and toxic cargos in its national preparedness standards.46
One author believes that a single LNG tanker exploding in Boston Harbor would
wipe out the city’s downtown areas. 47 Some maritime experts disagree, acknowl-
edging the security information about LNG tankers provided by several govern-
ment agencies but believing the concern overstated.48
A recent study by the ioMosaic Corporation draws upon field measurements,
operational information, and engineering information on LNG vessels gathered
over the last sixty years.49 It takes into account terrorism and other twenty-first-
century threats. The overall conclusion is straightforward—that in the highly
unlikely event of a very large scale release of liquified natural gas on land or wa-
ter, significant effects will be felt in the immediate vicinity.50 However, the zone
of impact would not extend anywhere close to the thirty miles predicted by some
groups.51 As long as an LNG vapor cloud is unconfined, it will not explode. A cloud
reaching a populated area would quickly find an ignition source and burn back to
the spill site before it could cover large numbers of people. If inflicting mass casual-
ties is the terrorist goal, LNG facilities and tankers are not good targets.52
Experts believe, however, that other dangerous cargos—such as poisonous
gas, ammonium nitrate, and other volatile chemicals—in bulk carriers could
pose a serious threat if the ships were seized by terrorists and used as weapons.
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Certain dangerous-cargo ships have come under close scrutiny from the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security, in particular by the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard
has created security teams to assess fifty-five militarily and economically strate-
gic ports. It has also completed special assessments of several classes of vessels,
including ferries, LNG tankers, certain dangerous-cargo barges, and single-skin
tank vessels. Based upon these assessments, the Coast Guard will escort vessels
that are potential security threats; further, it has developed a port security
risk-assessment tool to establish risk-based profiles of incoming vessels.53
Tankers in Port or Offshore Facilities
A common scenario in Department of Defense exercises is an attack on an oil
tanker or coastal petroleum facility to disrupt oil trade. According to the Los An-
geles Times the Limburg attack may have been conducted to do just that, by caus-
ing consternation among oil tanker operators.54 The bombing caused insurance
rates among Yemeni shippers to rise 300 percent and reduced Yemeni port ship-
ping volumes by 50 percent.55 Still, while this was bad news for Yemen, it did not
bring the global oil economy to its knees.
Contrast the Limburg incident with the Tanker War between Iran and Iraq in
the Persian Gulf between 1984 and 1987. Lloyd’s of London estimates that the
Tanker War seriously damaged 546 commercial vessels, killed about 430 civilian
mariners, and critically damaged the oil infrastructure in Iraq and Iran.56 But if
the campaign effectively crippled the Iranian oil industry for years, it encour-
aged oil stock building elsewhere, a rise in industrial production in consumer
countries, and an increase in production by the Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) to stabilize global oil production and consump-
tion.57 A study on the five most recent shocks to the oil economy finds, “It is re-
markable, looking back at that turbulent period [1980–87] that the major stock
market indexes in the U.S. were little affected by the events in the oil market.”58
Given, then, that an all-out war between Iran and Iraq in the Persian Gulf, with
nearly indiscriminate attacks on neutral shipping, causing the loss of over five
hundred oil tankers, did not cripple the oil economy, it is a stretch to believe that
an isolated terror attack against an oil tanker could strangle it today. Certainly,
oil prices might spike; however, during the past five years shocks to the global oil
economy increased petroleum prices, but in each case market pressures eventu-
ally subsided and oil prices slid back to almost preshock values.59
Infrastructure around Ports
In the wake of the terrorist attacks on 9/11, the security of ports themselves has
emerged as a significant part of the overall debate on homeland security. Many
security experts believe ports are vulnerable to terrorist attack because of their
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size, their easy accessibility by water and land, and the tremendous amount of
cargo they handle.60
As a result of all this attention, U.S. ports have taken enormous strides to re-
duce their vulnerabilities. The Coast Guard has provided for each a “captain of
the port,” the lead federal official for the security and safety of the vessels and
waterways in his or her geographic zone;61 the arrangement would streamline
the command and control of any federal response. The Coast Guard and CBP
have improved the quality and timing of information to be provided by ship-
pers and carriers with which the vulnerability of ports and the terrorist risk to
ships are evaluated.62 In addition to Operation SAFE COMMERCE the TSA has
fielded the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC), a tamper-
resistant biometric badge for workers requiring unescorted access to secure
areas of port facilities, outer continental shelf facilities, or vessels.63 The TWIC
is currently on track with an initial enrollment at a select few ports in March
2007. The Transportation Safety Administration predicts that it will be opera-
tional in 2007.64
Enforcement resources cannot be everywhere at all times. Security forces
must be enduring, sustainable, and able to accommodate both local and re-
gional requirements. On top of this, they must be flexible enough to adjust to
changing security levels. The post-9/11 environment has produced marine en-
forcement units with a special operations flavor, as opposed to merely patrol-
ling. For example, the Coast Guard has created active-duty, multimission,
mobile teams with specialized capabilities to close critical security gaps in the
nation’s strategic seaports.65
Despite the progress that has been made in strengthening port security, many
officials still describe seaports as “wide open”and “very vulnerable” to a terrorist
attack.66 In contrast to this claim is the fact that Congress provided over $650
million through fiscal year 2005 in direct federal grants to ports to improve op-
erational and physical security. This “plus-up” was in addition to the budgets of
the Coast Guard, CBP, TSA, and other federal agencies involved in port secu-
rity.67 Efforts by the U.S. government and the international community to im-
prove port security are proceeding at an unprecedented pace.68
Ferry Attacks
Policy makers and government officials frequently cite passenger ferries as a key
maritime security concern. In 2005, a congressman declared, “There is a serious
security gap in our ferry systems and we need to ensure that passengers on our
nation’s waterways are protected.”69 A RAND study in 2006 argued that attacks
on passenger ferries in the United States might be highly attractive to terrorists,
since they would be easy to execute, could kill many people, would likely draw
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significant media attention, and could demonstrate a terrorist group’s salience
and vibrancy.70
In a 2006 report, the Department of Justice identified ferry bombing as
among the most likely types of maritime terror attacks.71 It reached this conclu-
sion largely on the basis of the number of suspicious incidents reported at ma-
rine facilities in the Seattle area. However, the Seattle office of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation has suggested that the Justice Department’s high ranking of the
passenger ferry threat arises from more aggressive reporting of suspicious inci-
dents in that region than elsewhere in the country.72 FBI officials stated that they
have never been able to tie a specific suspicious incident to a terrorist group or
plan in the United States.73 While there appears to be a logical case for ferries as a
terrorist target, then, questions remain about actual terrorist activities related to
American ferries.74 Two positive by-products of all this attention are that it has
caused law enforcement to focus on ferries and that it has raised citizen aware-
ness with respect to out-of-the-ordinary activities on and near ferries. These two
trends will reduce the ability of terrorists to carry out a surprise attack on a ferry.
The fundamental implication of the attention and money being spent on the
previous scenarios is best summed up by a recent Congressional Research Ser-
vice report: “An accurate assessment of the current nature and scope of the
global maritime threat should be driven by what is probable rather than what is
merely possible. Sober analysis of the issue has been clouded amid anxiety cre-
ated by the global security climate with much of the discussion based on the no-
tion that maritime terrorists can strike any target with virtually any means
available.”75
Specifically—ships are being used as vectors for smuggling people and cargo
and laundering money to support land-based terrorism. Terrorist organiza-
tions, finding maritime attacks beyond their capability, are using maritime
cargo and ships as conveyances rather than as floating weapons. Like drug smug-
glers, terrorists are trying to blend in with the environment and not draw atten-
tion to their human cargo, containers, and financial support.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Thus, efforts to combat terrorism at sea should be focused on interdicting ter-
rorists attempting to sneak into the United States via a ship and on intercepting
terror-related materials aboard ships. By tracking people, cargo, and money, we
can disrupt a plan to use a small boat laden with explosives rather than simply
react to the attack.
Robert Bonner, former head of the Customs Service, has proposed that Amer-
ica create a new “electronic” (rather than physical), border, profiling the contents of
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containers in sophisticated data banks that collect and combine electronic docu-
ments existing in both government and commercial sources.76 He wants to con-
centrate on the top ten container ports; focusing on a few key ports and making
shipping companies face expensive delays unless they can validate cargo security,
he argues, are critical steps if the United States is to control containers.77
A great deal of information analysis on smuggled terrorists is still manpower
intensive. We need to leverage information technology and automate all sources
of maritime intelligence, freeing maritime analysts and operators to analyze the
bits of information that trickle in rather than having first to find the data and
package it in a usable format. As we share more information, we will have to auto-
mate its products in order to give everyone involved the ability to see the big pic-
ture and find previously hidden patterns or suspicious activities. We need to
automate our intelligence and operational inputs to enable peer-group review
of all source information.
Another issue absorbing a great deal of manpower is the attempt to find
anomalous behaviors. Terror groups, as we have seen, are interested in smug-
gling their operatives and terror-related materials and protecting their financial
backing, not in disrupting their primary method of transport. Like drug smug-
glers, they want to act in as normal and outwardly law-abiding a way as possible,
in order not to draw attention from authorities. Therefore, spending precious
capital on finding overt anomalies distracts from the war on terror and will
likely find only errant fishing vessels.
The war against terrorism is primarily a war of information. Interagency and
international cooperation is critical to putting together the pieces of the intelli-
gence puzzle. Progress has been made in breaking down the “stovepipes,” but
much more cooperation and free flow of information need to occur. The new
threat environment requires that the government not keep its security cards
close to its chest.78 Cooperation between credentialed agencies would help solve
a key problem—the inability of law enforcement officials and investigators in
the field to share their information with one another or other nations.79
Overclassification also requires attention. It is easy to stamp documents with
high classifications, to be “safe rather than sorry”; however, in doing so we cheat
ourselves out of the benefit of another organization’s analysis and viewpoint. We
need to move from a mind-set of “need to know” to one of “need to share.”
Another area requiring consistent American support is international collabo-
ration of maritime forces. U.S. maritime forces cannot be everywhere; they must
rely on partnerships for presence, information, and infrastructure. An example
of successful American outreach involves the Yemeni coast guard. Modeling it-
self on the U.S. Coast Guard, Yemen’s coast guard has established district bases
in the ports of Hodeidah and Aden. The three-year-old fleet has had a string of
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interdiction successes and has gained a regional reputation for tough law en-
forcement, particularly among those transporting undocumented workers.80
The United States must continue to take advantage of maritime forces offered
by international partnerships. For example, NATO ships are patrolling through-
out the Mediterranean, monitoring shipping and providing escorts to nonmili-
tary traffic through the Strait of Gibraltar to help detect, deter, and protect
against terrorist activity. The operation, called ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR, has evolved
out of NATO’s immediate response to 9/11.81 The alliance deployed its Standing
Naval Force to the eastern Mediterranean on 6 October 2001 in a demonstration
of resolve and solidarity in the wake of the attacks, following the invocation of
Article 5, the collective-defense provision of the North Atlantic Treaty.82
Recognizing critical gaps in their ability to identify and prioritize maritime
threats in the Malacca Straits, a zone of worldwide importance, several U.S.
combatant commands have partnered with the Republic of Singapore in an ini-
tiative called Comprehensive Maritime Awareness. The project utilizes technol-
ogy and information sharing to enhance maritime domain awareness in one of
the world’s busiest shipping lanes.83 Singapore’s involvement is critical; it is
astride major shipping lanes adjacent to the Strait of Malacca. This kind of inter-
national program for information sharing, technology, and maritime partner-
ship will help close the seams in Southeast Asia. If this initiative works, it will
need to be exported to all global shipping choke points.
We have made great strides in force protection, port security measures, and
multiagency cooperation, but we have accomplished only the easiest tasks. Agencies,
governments, and businesses in the maritime environment need to reach out to
each other and collaborate effectively. They need also to recognize that disruption of
criminal enterprises at sea is a lynchpin of security. Terrorists use smuggling, covert
financial mechanisms, and other criminal enterprises to support their land-based
activities.84 Turning a ship into a floating bomb may appear to be attractive to a
terror organization, but actually doing it is much more difficult than attacking a
land target. We must focus antiterror and counterterror efforts on what is most
probable—criminal activities at sea that support terrorism on land—rather
than on such a long-shot terror option as using a ship as a weapon.
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